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In 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores over Kameido, Japan. Spore samples
were obtained from the release site, cultured, and characterized by molecular genetic typing. The isolates were
consistent with strain Sterne 34F2, which is used in Japan for animal prophylaxis against anthrax.
Strain identification in Bacillus anthracis has been problem-
atic due to a lack of distinguishing features, both phenotypic
and molecular (1). With the identification of variable-number
tandem repeats (VNTRs), identification of strains (unique ge-
notypes) by multiple-locus VNTR analysis (MLVA) is now
possible, and worldwide clone-based diversity patterns have
been demonstrated (2). The VNTR loci are hypervariable and
have multiple allelic states that provide high discrimination
capacity for differentiating among strains and for identifying
evolutionary relationships. There are about six major world-
wide clonal lineages and nearly 100 unique types now known.
We recently applied this typing system to a forensic study of
a B. anthracis strain associated with the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s
activities. Our objective was to determine whether the strain
was similar to any other previously known types from our
studies of B. anthracis worldwide diversity (2). This informa-
tion could potentially identify the origin of the strain used in
the bioterrorism attack and provide insights into how or why
the attack was carried out.
In June 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo cult sprayed a liquid sus-
pension of B. anthracis from their headquarters building in
Kameido, near Tokyo, Japan (3; H. Takahashi, A. Kaufmann,
K. L. Smith, P. Keim, and K. Taniguchi, Program 4th Int.
Anthrax Conf., p. 27, 2001). While this aerosolization went
largely unnoticed, the cult’s later (1995) sarin gas attack of a
Tokyo subway attracted worldwide attention. It was only with
testimony of cult members and a retrospective investigation (3;
Takahashi et al., 4th Int. Anthrax Conf.) that the 1993 incident
was recognized as an anthrax release. The cult had developed
and constructed a delivery system that involved the pumping of
a liquid bacterial suspension up eight floors of their headquar-
ters building to an aerosol dispersal device on the roof. During
the aerosol dispersal, health authorities received numerous
public complaints concerning odors emanating from the build-
ing. Upon investigation, they observed and collected a fluid
from the outside of the building. An archived (stored at 4°C)
portion of this fluid was analyzed in this study.
We examined the fluid collected from the Aum Shinrikyo
headquarters for bacterial content. Microscopically, malachite
green and safranin staining revealed stained spores, a large
amount of debris, and other bacterial cells. Aliquots of the
fluid were cultured by spreading on sheep blood agar plates
and incubated at 37°C under ambient CO2 concentrations.
Approximately 4  104 CFU per ml were observed, though
most of the colonies grew only weakly. This weak growth was
inconsistent with normal B. anthracis characteristics under
these conditions, and we did not investigate these poorly grow-
ing bacteria further. About 10% of the colonies were typical of
B. anthracis and had robust nonhemolytic “gray ground glass”
colonies, ca. 4 103 CFU per ml. Forty-eight of these colonies
were purified by single-colony streaking and subjected to
MLVA. All 48 isolated colonies were determined to be B.
anthracis and to have identical MLVA genotypes. The DNA
isolation and MLVA genotyping were performed as previously
described (2), and results were then compared to an electronic
database of worldwide B. anthracis isolates. The eight VNTR
marker analyses resulted in specific PCR amplicon sizes that
had been previously observed only in B. anthracis. All 48 iso-
lates had the following genotype: vrrA, 313 bp; vrrB1, 229 bp;
vrrB2, 162 bp; vrrC1, 583 bp; vrrC2, 532 bp; CG3, 158 bp;
pXO1-aat, 129 bp; pXO2-at, no amplification. The lack of
PCR amplification at the pXO2 markers is consistent with
strains that are missing the pXO2 plasmid entirely.
The MLVA genotype and the lack of amplification from the
pXO2-at marker were consistent with results obtained with the
Sterne vaccine strain. The Sterne strain is a member of the
A3.b diversity cluster, and only four naturally occurring B.
anthracis strains had the same seven-marker genotype (2). No
other natural isolate that is also missing the pXO2 plasmid
marker with this genotype has been observed. Given the com-
mercial availability of the Sterne 34F2 vaccine strain in Japan
for veterinary purposes, it is reasonable to conclude that the B.
anthracis strain collected from the Aum Shinrikyo headquar-
ters building is indeed Sterne. There have been reports that the
cult had obtained a veterinary vaccine strain of anthrax (3).
Our MLVA results substantiate this and lend credence to the
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scenario that the cult was using this strain in their activities and
possibly in bioterrorism attacks. It would seem to be a rela-
tively easy undertaking for the cult to obtain a vial of the
animal vaccine and cultivate the Sterne strain. It is clear from
our analysis that the B. anthracis dispersal by the Aum Shin-
rikyo had little possibility for endangering human life.
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